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An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law. By Roscoe Pound. New Haven,
Yale University Press; London, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press,
1922. PP. 307.
This volume contains a series of six lectures delivered on the Storrs founda-
tion at the Yale Law School and is a worthy addition to the many series previ-
ously delivered on this foundation by leaders of juristic thought. Dean Pound
first defines for us the Function of Legal Philosophy; then follow chapters on
the End of Law, the Application of Law, "Liability," Property, and Contract.
Perhaps the chief criticism to which philosophers of the past have been sub-
ject is that they have presented their very finite wisdom as if it were infinite,
that in a world of constant evolutionary adjustment to an ever changing environ-
ment they have claimed a universal and eternal validity for their rules and
explanations. They have sought to give us an "ultimate solving idea," "a moral
and legal and political chart for all time," "a perfect law which should stand
fast forever." Dean Pound says that we are not to "scoff at this ambitious
aim"; but this means only that criticism should be polite and that the critic
should first demolish his own glass house. The following quotation indicates the
view of the author: "philosophies of law have, been attempts to give a rational
account of the law of the time and place, or attempts to formulate a general
theory of the legal order to meet the needs of some given period of legal develop-
ment, or attempts to state the results of the two former attempts universally
and to make them all-sufficient for law everywhere and for all time. Historians
of the philosophy of law have fixed their eyes chiefly on the third. But this
is the least valuable part of legal philosophy."
He proceeds to state for us the contribution to legal philosophy of the Greeks,
the Romans, the Middle Ages, the age of colonization, and the 19th century,
there being alternation between periods of growth, when theories of "natural
law" have prevailed, and periods of consolidation or reaction, when emphasis
was put upon authority and the law was regarded as complete and in need of
nothing that could not be supplied by history and analysis.
Philosophies, theories of law and its purpose, grow out of the particular needs
and activities of men at any given time and place. Thus, primitive theory is
that the end of law is the keeping of the peace. The Greeks, Romans, and the
Middle Ages regarded it as the maintenance of the social status quo. In the
age of discovery and expansion it was the maximum of liberty. Since Igo it has
been the maximum satisfaction of wants and the relative valuation of these.
We now distinguish between factual wants and legal rights and privileges,
arriving at the latter by a conscious compromise. The question now is, how are
we to weigh conflicting interests and effect the compromise. There is no definite
answer ready to be given.
The lecture on the Application of Law is a discussion of the methods by which
the courts have tried to apply rules of law to cases so as to square with the
mores, the current notions of justice and morality. The author stresses the
necessity of rules and the equal necessity of disregarding them on occasion. He
argues that the public must be educated up to a proper conception of the func-
tion of the judge as that of logical interpreter in the main, but also and in a
large degree that of administrator and legislator as well. The dogma of separa-
tion of powers cannot control; it results merely in a division of labor. Especi-
ally is this true in periods of growth like the present. The judge can no longer
merely apply a "rule." In many fields, cases are unique and cannot be decided
merely by a rule. They have to be decided by application of a "standard"--as,
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for example, that of the reasonably prudent man-and standards change much
faster than rules. He is a wise judge who can maintain the proper balance
between "rule" and "discretion." As justice becomes "individualized," rules
become undermined and uncertain, respect for law declines, and a demand begins
to be heard for restatement and simplification.
In the lecture on "Liability," that term is chosen to express the relation of
right and duty between two persons, the discussion being limited in the main
to the field of torts. The most striking part of this discussion lies in the asser-
tion-surely correct-that to base liability for negligence upon "fault," "blame-
worthiness," or "culpability" is to base it upon a "dogmatic fiction"' "Is an act
blameworthy because the actor has a slow reaction time or was born impulsive
or is naturally timid or is easily 'rattled' and hence in an emergency does not
come up to the standard of what a reasonably prudent man would do in such
an emergency, as applied ex post facto by twelve average men in the jury box?"
"But what the law is really regarding is not his culpable exercise of his will
but the danger to the general security if he and his fellows act affirmatively
without coming up to the standard imposed to maintain that security." This
is sound and true, but it cuts deeper than may appear; it affords the explanation
of morality as well as of negligence. "Fault' ceases to be a "dogmatic fiction"
as soon as we realize that it is merely a failure to come up to a standard and
that any kind of immorality is the same. Our standards of morality are based
upon the experience of the race and are so strongly believed to be necessary to
survival that those who cannot live up to them are penalized, regarded with
dislike, and gradually edged off the earth.
It would help all of our lawyers, radical and conservative alike, if they would
read and could understand Dean Pound's discussion of property and contract.
They, too, are merely evolutionary adjustments through the long centuries. His
last word on property is as follows:
"We may believe that the law of property is a wise bit of social engineering in
the world as we know it, and that we satisfy more human wants, secure more
interests, with a sacrifice of less thereby than by anything we are likely to devise-
we may believe this without holding that private property is eternally and
absolutely necessary and that human society may not expect in some civilization,
which we cannot forecast, to achieve something different and something better."
The doctrine of consideration is treated with an intelligent insight that is
indeed rare if not unequalled. He comes to about the same conclusion as did
Professor Lorenzen with respect to the doctrine of causa in the Roman law.
Causa and Consideration in the Law of Contracts (IgIg) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL,
621. "Projects for 'restatement of law' are in the air. But a restatement of
what has never been stated is an impossibility and as yet there is no authoritative
statement of what the law of consideration is." It is true that past definitions
and historical explanations and philosophical theories of consideration are inade-
quate for the law as it is being applied to-day. But no worthy "restatement"
will ever merely copy past "statements." It must, instead, bring the statements
up even with the applications. Dean Pound's lecture will be very helpful in
doing this.
Of course, philosophical theories greatly influence the actual decisions; but
they do this only because they never precede but are based upon decisions.
They are the afterthoughts, frequently lame and halting ones, following upon
mass movements of many individuals in their conscious and unconscious adjust-
ment to conditions about them. The courts are reacting to the feelings and
opinions of the community and are building a law of consideration. The process
is continuous and never ending. A new "philosophical theory of enforcement
of promises" will help, if it truly explains what the courts have already done
and accurately predicts that which they are going to do.
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Dean Pound's lectures are not easy reading; but those who know enough to
be able to read with understanding will be rewarded with many new and enlight-
ening ideas. Few other jurists of to-day are so broadly familiar with past tradi-
tion as he or so thoroughly emancipated from its shackles.
ARTHR= L. ComniN
Yale University School of Law
The Supreme Court in United States History. By Charles Warren. In Three
Volumes. Boston, Little, Brown & Company, 1922. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 540;
Vol. II, 1-55o; Vol. III, 1-532.
An adequate history of the Supreme Court has been long awaited. Biogra-
phies of members of the Court have multiplied-some notable biographies. Two
attempts have been made to trace the history of the Court through the lives of
the Chief Justices. Laborious treatises have been written on the law as
expounded by the Court. Monographs without number have analyzed the deci-
sions of the Court. A socialist writer has recorded his impressions of the inter-
ests which seem to him to have affected the utterances of the federal judges.
But no attempt has been made on the scale of the work before us to treat the
Supreme Court as a continuous institution whose history is inseparably inter-!
twined with the general development of American society. In his preface and
introductory chapter, however, the author of these three volumes carefully
delimits his subject and warns his readers not to demand more than he has to
give. And it would be a surly critic indeed who would censure him for not
attempting what he has expressly refrained from doing. Surely an author may
choose his own task!
The reviewer feels bound, nevertheless, to record his disappointment that only
tvo chapters out of the thirty-eight are devoted to the history of the Court within
the last thirty years-in many respects the most important epoch since Chief
Justice Marshall laid the foundations of American constitutional law. If the
author felt any distrust of his own fitness for writing the history of this highly
controversial period, the reviewer would like to demur. In his opinion no one
could have entered upon this last phase with surer step and greater poise than
the author of these volumes.
Another disappointment is in store for some readers of this work. This is
not a history of American constitutional law as expounded by the federal judici-
ary, but a history of the Supreme Court in American history. It is an attempt
to correlate the work of the Court at different epochs with the general history
of the country-"an attempt to revivify the important cases decided by the Court
and to picture the Court itself from year to year in its contemporary setting."
It has seemed to the author perhaps just as important--certainly just as interest-
ing-to know what people thought and felt about the decisions of the Court,
as to ascertain the legal grounds for those decisions. Unquestionably it is
highly desirable to know how the public reacted to the decisions of the Court on
controverted questions. The revulsion of public opinion in the North from the
Dred Scott decision (I856, U. S.) ig How. 393, is a circumstance of great import-
ance in ante-bellum political history, irrespective of the effect of the decision
upon the future of slavery in the territories. Or, to take a more modern instance,
the decision of the court in Lockner v. New York (i9o5) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup.
Ct 539, has more than a legal interest to students of American politics. The
protest of labor has had direct political consequences and the animus of labor
may quite conceivably have reacted in subtle ways upon the judiciary, as well
as upon other organs of the government.
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